

Corps' defensive line and then rolled up the 8th Army's right flank.

(2) He notes that S.L.A. Marshall's book, *THE RIVER AND THE GAUNTLET*, contains a number of major errors. He corrects them, and warns that Marshall's book should be used "always with discretion."

(3) He believes the near destruction of the 2d U.S. Infantry Division during its withdrawal from Kunu-ri to Sunchon on 29 and 30 November 1950 need not have happened if the U.S. IX Corps and 8th Army commanders and staff officers had been on top of the situation. He also believes the 2d Division commander, Major General Laurence B. Keiser, was made the scapegoat for what did happen.

(4) He feels the 8th Army's withdrawal from North Korea was more a "big bugout" than a "skillful retreat," and holds the higher commanders in Korea directly responsible for the 8th Army's sorry performance during that withdrawal.

This is not an easy book to read. It is filled with tactical details but lacks the maps needed to understand them. But it is definitely worth the effort and all Infantrymen can learn much from it. This is generally true of all of Appleman's histories, even if he seems to favor (or find fault with) certain units and commanders.

THE HOLLOW ARMY: HOW THE U.S. ARMY IS OVERSOLD AND UNDERMANNED. By William Darryl Henderson. Contributions in Military Studies Number 93 (Greenwood Press, 1990. 184 Pages. \$39.95). The author, a retired U.S. Army officer, does not believe today's Army, because of its enlisted component, is a quality one. He feels, rather, that the Army "has, in fact, not risen above mediocre performance levels" particularly in the combat arms. He offers several reasons: There are too few combat arms soldiers overall and certainly too few in the higher mental categories; the enlisted personnel management system seemingly penalizes the combat arms NCOs while rewarding those in the administrative MOSs; the creation of "staff NCOs" has reduced the number of good NCOs available for troop duty; and the present centralized and bureaucratic personnel system has not only drawn away even more NCOs from troop duty, it has almost totally destroyed a small unit commander's prerogatives. This has prevented the Army from forming cohesive, properly trained and led units, and has caused unnecessary personnel turbulence. He offers a number of solutions, some of which can be guessed at from reading the above. But read the book and see what you think of his arguments.

Finally, we offer you our thoughts on sev-

eral recently published books outside the field of U.S. military history:

• **THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN.** By Richard Townshend Bickers, et al. (Prentice Hall, 1990. 208 Pages. \$29.95). This year marks the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Britain, the great aerial contest between Great Britain's Royal Air Force and Germany's Luftwaffe between 8 August 1940 and 31 October 1940. (Some British historians give 10 July 1940 as the start date, while the Luftwaffe considered 11 May 1941 the end date.)

This book is a glowing tribute to those who took part in this epic battle regardless of job or position. The greatest emphasis is on the RAF and its fighting squadrons. It is filled with photographs, drawings, reproductions, tables, and maps. Post-war investigations proved that the RAF suffered 915 losses, the Luftwaffe, 1,733.

• **STRATEGIC SURVEY, 1989-1990.** Published by Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London (Brassey's, 1990. 240 Pages. \$21.95, Softbound). The information described and analyzed in this fine publication was current as of late March 1990. Accordingly, some of the material has been overtaken by events. But there is no better source of information on the major world happenings in 1989, which, of course, were dominated by the events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. To the editors of this volume, one of the most serious problems facing the world is the veritable flood of refugees that has washed over many countries and that now "has become a major consideration in the security affairs of all states."

• **STRATEGIC ATLAS: A COMPARATIVE GEOPOLITICS OF THE WORLD'S POWERS.** A Revised and Updated Edition. By Gerard Chaliand and Jean-Pierre Rageau. Translated from the French by Tony Berrett. Maps by Catherine Petit (Harper and Row, 1990. Perennial Library. 224 Pages. \$17.95, Softbound). This atlas, different in many respects from others, is an outstanding one. It can be used as a perfect complement to the strategic survey mentioned above, or it can easily be used alone. It presents basically the same material, but in an entirely different format. The maps, drawn from various projections, show graphically the importance of the world's oceans, something usually overlooked by soldiers. Overall, the atlas is valuable for the information it contains on such subjects as the geopoliticians and their theories, economic data and population factors, and the military balance. It is an outstanding piece of work that all Infantrymen should know about.

• **UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN EUROPE.** By Simon Duke. Published for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford University Press, 1989. 435 Pages. \$68.00). It is difficult to realize just how extensive the U.S. military presence is in Europe. This book provides the background for understanding the scope of that presence by tracing the history of the bases in each of the 14 European countries that host various kinds of U.S. facilities. It also provides, where possible, the U.S.-host nation basing agreements for each country. In several annexes, the author offers statistics on the U.S. forces now in Europe, discusses the organization of the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Forces in Europe, outlines the major weapon systems used by U.S. forces in Europe, and provides a brief bibliographical note. This is an outstanding reference work, one that will prove as valuable to the future historian as it is to today's.

• **WEAPON SYSTEMS, 1990: UNITED STATES ARMY (USGPO S/N 008-020-01199-1. 1990. 188 Pages. \$13.00, Softbound).** This is the Army's annual review of its major weapon systems, many of which are now in production, while others are in different stages of development. The systems are arranged according to specific Army mission areas such as close combat, air defense, fire support, combat support, and the like. Each system is described by its mission, characteristics, and program status; where appropriate, any Soviet counterparts are also described.

Now here are a number of our longer reviews:

INTERVENTION IN THE CARIBBEAN: THE DOMINICAN CRISIS OF 1965. By General Bruce Palmer, Jr. (University Press of Kentucky, 1989. 226 Pages. \$23.00).

MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT: U.S. INTERVENTION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1965. By Herbert G. Schoonmaker. Contributions in Military Studies Number 95 (Greenwood Press, 1990. 152 Pages. \$37.95). Both books reviewed by Colonel James G. McConaughy, United States Army Retired.

According to Herbert Schoonmaker, President Lyndon Johnson told the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Earl Wheeler, to send "the best general in the Pentagon" to Santo Domingo when the 1965 revolution, with possible communist overtones, threatened U.S. lives and political interests. General Wheeler picked Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, then Army Deputy

Chief of Staff for Operations, and the XVIII Airborne Corps for the operation.

These two books describe the problems facing what became the DOMREP peacekeeping mission and the solutions it and its umbrella Inter-American Peace Force achieved.

Schoonmaker has produced a work worthy of the Harvard Business School. He divides the events into component parts and then dissects each with a sharp knife, all the while maintaining a narrative theme.

General Palmer, on the other hand, paints his portrait of the affair with lights and shadows—warts and all—as befits his part in it. And he alone possessed a research treasure, although he does not mention it in his book: the taped record of each day's events in DOMREP that he had dictated each night before he retired.

A reader of either book comes away impressed with the military services' organizational functions and the political and diplomatic supervision provided. Despite an initial uncertainty of the exact mission or its political dimensions, the controls and resource allocations provide the focus for Schoonmaker's study. Both books do note two glaring deficiencies that existed at the beginning of the operation: poor intelligence and less-than-good communications.

Thus, the operations plan placed the 82d Airborne Division's night drop zone on a coral reef. Obviously our military attaches had not inspected the area before designating it. Disaster was avoided when the arriving planes were directed to land their troops and equipment at the San Isidro airfield, which had recently been secured by friendly Dominican Army forces.

In addition, our top military advisory group officers were absent—they were attending a conference in Panama—when the coup began.

The available intelligence that was developed suffered from reporting delays because of defective communications. Person-to-person helicopter flights were used in place of absent radio equipment, although this defect was soon corrected by teams from the CIA, FBI, and Army Special Forces. These teams were able to confirm that the only insurgency was in the city of Santo Domingo itself.

Both authors pay deserved tribute to the Organization of American States, which assumed overall responsibility for the effort. This led to the establishment of a provisional government, followed by the OAS-monitored presidential election of 1966. But praise should also be given to the humanitarian efforts exerted by the men of the airborne division.

General Palmer's last chapter on Caribbean realities facing the United States is thoughtful, but it predates our Panama intervention and the Nicaraguan election.

Since the demise of the Warsaw Pact, these books have become more relevant as our military and diplomatic energies now center on long range hemispheric planning. Schoonmaker's book provides the broader base as the ultimate generic after action report. Its disciplined categories comprise the crisis management implications of almost any military operation. But Palmer's book is more fun to read.

STORMTROOP TACTICS: INNOVATION IN THE GERMAN ARMY, 1914-1918. By Bruce I. Gudmundsson (Praeger, 1989. 210 Pages. \$39.95). Reviewed by Colonel David A. Rolston, United States Army.

The author's main point is a simple one: Germany's blitzkrieg tactics at the beginning of World War II should not have surprised the military leaders of the other European countries. He believes that the "new" German tactics were not developed overnight but were, in fact, the result of an evolution that had begun during World War I. He also argues that these tactics did not result from doctrinal developments at high levels within the German Army command but evolved from the bottom up as small unit commanders sought innovative ways of overcoming the stalemate of trench warfare.

As a result, new equipment and organizations—the stormtroops and the modified jaeger battalions—came into being. As the new tactical innovations were refined, the organizations were modified as necessary. A key role in their success was the elevation of the noncommissioned officers to new positions of importance. They now became true leaders who led from the front and had individual missions to plan and execute.

The author does a good job of explaining the evolution of stormtroop tactics—they did not first appear in 1918, as many writers claim—as well as the development and employment of the weapons that were used. His book gives a better understanding of how tactics and doctrine evolve and an appreciation of the benefits of an open-minded approach to solving a tactical problem. It is recommended reading for all military professionals.

STRANGE GROUND: AMERICANS IN VIETNAM, 1945-1973, AN ORAL HIS-

TORY. By Harry Maurer (Henry Holt, 1989. 633 Pages. \$29.95). Reviewed by Doctor Joe P. Dunn, Converse College.

This book can be added to the growing list of oral histories by such individuals as Al Santoli, Joe Klein, Mark Baker, Wallace Terry, Kathryn Marshall, Myra MacPherson, and others. Although it claims to be the "first complete Vietnam story" from the end of World War II through the end of the long war, it is neither better nor worse than most of the others.

The interviews with 67 individuals cover the requisite types who experienced the war—grunts, generals, protesters, policymakers, prisoners of war, women, civilians, and many others. The interviews are longer than those in some of the other books.

As with many who undertake such projects, the author was an anti-war protester and is now trying to understand the war and those who engaged in it. The selection is reasonably balanced.

Oral histories are fascinating and valuable sources for understanding the Vietnam war. I encourage reading as many of them as one can, and this is as good a place to start as any other.

HOW THE NORTH WON: A MILITARY HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR. By Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones (University of Illinois Press, 1983. 762 Pages. \$24.95). Reviewed by Major Don Rightmyer, United States Air Force.

This is the type of book that should make readers stop and take notice. Its size alone makes it a bargain at the quoted price, but its real value is in its breadth and quality. It is also a book that should take its place in the curriculum of military academies, war colleges, and the personal libraries of all military professionals.

The authors are both noted Civil War historians. In this book they look not only at the obvious elements that one would expect from such a history but also at some of the less glamorous but equally vital issues such as logistics, combat effectiveness, and high command organization. A special appendix titled "An Introduction to the Study of Military Operations" should give even the novice military historian a better grasp of all that went on during the various military campaigns.

Unlike many military histories, this one has numerous well drawn maps for virtually every battle, and these are most welcome additions to the fine narrative. The final plus of this volume is a complete bibliography that readily serves as an aid to those who wish to

pursue their reading and study on the Civil War.

The book reflects a vast amount of work and is a most welcome contribution to Civil War literature.

NAPOLEON'S MILITARY MACHINE.

By Philip J. Haythornthwaite (Hippocrene Books, 1988. 200 Pages. \$35.00). Reviewed by Colonel John C. Spence III, United States Army Reserve.

The author, a military historian with an interest in 19th Century Europe, has compiled a short but informative overview of Napoleon's military organizations, strategy, tactics, and important campaigns. Perhaps the glamor of this book makes it more appropriate for display on a coffee table. It is, nevertheless, a valuable addition to the extensive literature on 19th Century warfare.

The author provides ample space for his analyses of Napoleon's major campaigns and writes convincingly of Napoleon's adherence to the principle of unity of command. The student of military science and tactics will readily understand the organizational philosophy Napoleon adopted in creating units ranging from battalions to his grand army.

The book is replete with impressive and colorful artwork, and these alone almost justify the cost of the book.

LIC 2010: SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN THE NEXT CENTURY. By Rod Pascall (Pergamon-Brassey's Future Warfare Series. Published with the Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the United States Army. 1990. 166 Pages. \$23.00). Reviewed by Colonel James B. Motley, United States Army Retired.

This book, arranged in nine chapters, is about low intensity conflict (LIC), a form of warfare, and special operations forces (SOF), a type of military organization, and how they will appear in the year 2010. The author, a retired U.S. Army officer and a former commander of the Delta Force, is well qualified to write on both subjects.

In his initial chapter, Pascall discusses a number of words and phrases commonly used in any discussion of LIC and SOF. (His definition of LIC is: "armed conflict for political purposes short of combat between organized forces.") He also describes the general structure of U.S., British, and Soviet SOF and contends that in the period 1990 to 2010 "the least amount of change will prob-

ably be seen in the British model."

He uses his succeeding chapters to discuss coming global changes, certain technological trends, special operations in high- and mid-intensity conflicts, and LIC from the perspective of terrorism and counter-terrorism, insurgency and counterinsurgency, and peace-making and peacekeeping.

Pascall believes that the "expanding roles" for SOF "are not in low-intensity conflict" but "are to be found on the higher end of the conflict spectrum" and specifically in the realm of "war deterrence." However, he does foresee "an increasing incidence rate of low-intensity conflict." In some respects, he sends mixed signals.

The book's major shortcoming is the author's failure to acknowledge the precise role that SOF, especially SOF mobile training teams, and civil affairs units can play in Third World nation-building efforts.

Overall, the book will appeal to the specialist rather than to the general reader.

ONE DAY IN A LONG WAR. By Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price (Random House, 1989. 217 Pages. \$18.95). Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Mudie, United States Air Force Retired.

On 30 March 1972 the North Vietnamese Army began a massive attack by 12 divisions against the South Vietnamese military forces—the Easter Offensive. President Richard Nixon realized this was a desperate attempt by the North to discredit his Vietnamization program and apply political pressure in the forthcoming U.S. presidential campaign.

Four years earlier, President Lyndon Johnson had ordered a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam hoping that U.S. restraint would bring a negotiated peace. With the initial success of their newest offensive, however, the North Vietnamese leaders had no intention of continuing the talks or making any concessions. Despite the internal political pressures and an imminent meeting with Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev, President Nixon ordered that a new air campaign, named Linebacker, begin.

This book is a well-written description of the first day of the Linebacker operation—10 May 1972. The authors have done an excellent job of describing the tremendous amount of coordination necessary to carry out successfully an air attack that employed different types of aircraft from different services—the Air Force and the Navy—with different missions.

The importance of SAM (surface-to-air

missile) suppression, early warning, search-and-rescue, airborne command and control, signal intelligence gathering, and aerial refueling are all covered. But the authors excel in their description of air-to-air combat between F-4s and MiGs and successful attacks with "smart" bombs.

Although Linebacker succeeded in returning the North Vietnamese to the Paris talks, within a few months they had regressed to their previous intransigent ways. President Nixon then ordered Linebacker II, the so-called Christmas bombing campaign that included attacks by B-52s against Hanoi and Haiphong for the first time. Less than a month later, the North Vietnamese finally signed the peace accords.

Neither author is a fighter pilot, but both are experienced fliers with an understanding of the highly technical requirements of modern air-to-air combat. As such they are able to describe quite clearly what happened without resorting to an excessive use of that unique fighter pilot lingo that often leaves readers impressed, but confused.

For that reason alone, it is a useful book for infantrymen who desire a better understanding of the other elements of tactical air warfare that occur beyond their immediate surroundings.

RECENT AND RECOMMENDED

1991 WARFARE WARRIORS CALENDAR: MILITARY HISTORY FROM 1776 TO THE PRESENT. By Raymond R. Lyman. Paladin Press (P.O. Box 1307, Boulder, CO 80306), 1990. \$9.95, Softbound.

ANZIO BEACHHEAD, 22 JANUARY-25 MAY 1944. CMH Publication 100-10. First printed for the American Forces in Action Series in 1948. USGPO S/N 008-029-00199-3. 1990. 122 Pages. \$11.00, Softbound.

THE STORY OF THE NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER CORPS: THE BACKBONE OF THE ARMY. General Editors: Arnold G. Fisch, Jr. and Robert K. Wright, Jr. CMH Publication 70-38. USGPO S/N 008-029-00191-8. 1989. 236 Pages. \$21.00, Softbound.

FIGHTING WORDS FROM WAR, REBELLION, AND OTHER COMBATIVE CAPERS. By Christine Ammer. Paragon House, 1989. 266 Pages. \$10.95, Softbound.

DESERT WARFARE: FROM ITS ROMAN ORIGINS TO THE GULF CONFLICT. By Bryan Perrett. Sterling, 1988. 224 Pages. \$24.95.

THE CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. By Willard J. Webb and Ronald H. Cole. Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff. USGPO S/N 008-000-00541-9. 1989. 159 Pages. \$16.00.

FIELD ARTILLERY AND FIREPOWER. By J.B.A. Bailey. The Military Press, Oxford. Combined Arms Library, Volume 1. 1989. 385 Pages. \$29.50, Softbound.